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I. I NTRODUCTION
In this Article, I undertake a very preliminary inquiry into some
aspects of the concept of harm. My excuse for doing so in a symposium
on compensation is that, in private law and particularly in tort law, an
award of damages is often intended to compensate for harm; if we do not
know something about the nature of harm, we cannot fully understand
the nature of at least this type of compensation. To avoid one possible
source of confusion, I should add immediately that harm is not the only
thing that can be compensated by an award of compensatory damages.
Compensation in law is generally meant to rectify a setback to an

* Fiorello La Guardia Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, New York
University School of Law. I am grateful for very insightful responses to an earlier
version of this Article by John Goldberg at the symposium on compensation held at the
University of San Diego in February 2003 and by Andrew Simester at the Oxford
Jurisprudence Colloquium held at Oxford in March 2003. I also benefited a great deal
from the comments of other participants on both occasions. Because I was able to revise
the Article for publication in only the most limited way, I have unfortunately not been
able to discuss many of the points raised by Goldberg, Simester, and others. I hope to do
so in future work.
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interest, but, I shall argue, while all instances of harm are setbacks to
interests, not all setbacks to interests are instances of harm. Further, in
cases where the law imposes liability for omissions-that is, for
breaching an affirmative duty to put someone in a certain position-it
may be that the term "compensation" is appropriate even if the person
being compensated has not suffered any setback, in the sense of an
historical worsening, at all. However, nothing that I have to say about
harm will turn on accepting one account rather than another of the
concept of compensation.
To avoid one other possible source of confusion, I should also
emphasize at the outset that my inquiry is into the nature of harm and not
into the nature of causation. I shall argue that an instance of harm is not
simply a certain kind of condition or state of being, but rather must have
been brought about by a causal process. While causation and harm are
obviously distinct concepts, it might be thought that, because harm is the
result of a causal process, one's analysis of causation must carry over to
one's analysis of harm. If causation is properly analyzable in counterfactual
terms, for example, it might be thought that the same must be true of
1
harm. That, however, would be a mistake. To ask what it means to say
that event A caused event B is one question; to ask what it means to say
that event B is harmful is another.
In Part II, taking a seminal article by Joel Feinberg as my starting
point,2 I consider two possible characterizations of harm. Both treat
harm as a setback to an interest and as involving a comparison between
two states of affairs , but one supposes that the relevant comparison is
based on a counterfactual inquiry, while the other supposes that it is
based on an historical inquiry. I argue that the historical characterization
is the preferable one. In Part III, I consider a critique offered by Seana
Shiffrin of comparative accounts of harm in general. 3 In Part IV, I try to
say something further about the relationship among harm, interests,
and rights. Finally, in Part V, I present some considerations in favor of
the view that even though harm should be characterized historically,
compensation for harm in tort should often be determined counterfactually,
by reference to what would have happened had the tort not occurred.

I. Michael Moore very persuasively cntlc1zes the counterfactual analysis of
causation in Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual
Baselines, 40 SAN DI EGO L. REV. 1181 (2003).
2. JOEL FEINB ERG, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in
FREEDOM AND FULFILLM ENT 3 ( 1992).
3. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the
Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117 ( 1999).
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II.

HARM, COUNTERFACTUALS, AND HISTORICAL WORSENING

Speaking of "harm" in the sense that he takes to be presupposed by the
harm principle and, more generally, to be of interest to the civil and
criminal law, Joel Feinberg offers the following analysis:
A harms B in the relevant sense if and only if:
1. A acts (in a sense wide enough to include omissions and extended sequences
of activity).
2. A' s action is defective or faulty with respect to the risks it creates to B, that
is, it is done either with the intention of producing the consequences for B
that follow, or similarly adverse ones, or with negligence or recklessness in
respect to those consequences.
3. A's acting in that manner is indefensible, that is, neither excusable nor
justifiable.
4. A's action is the cause of an adverse effect on B's self-interest (a "state of
harm").
4
5. A's action is also a violation of B's right.

Feinberg notes in a footnote that condition 5 might, given conditions 3
and 4, be redundant. A more important point, however, concerns whether
or not conditions 2, 3, and 5 are appropriately included as necessary
conditions at all in the analysis. Feinberg is clearly analyzing the notion
of a harm in moral terms, and he is right to do so. This is true if for no
other reason than that condition 4, which I take to be the heart of the
analysis, requires that A's act have an adverse effect on B's self-interest.
Determining what constitutes a person' s self-interest, as well as
determining what effects on self-interest should count as adverse, clearly
involves substantive moral argument. However, the fact that the analysis of
"A harms B" is at least partially moral in character does not entail that
A's harming act must have been, say, faulty or defective (condition 2).
Even if we follow Feinberg and restrict our attention to harms that might
be of concern to the law, insisting on conditions 2, 3 , and 5 clearly
leaves out of account the possibility of certain theoretical approaches to
tort law in particular; condition 2, for example, is incompatible with
strict liability. Perhaps strict liability is not in the end a defensible
theory of recovery in tort, but that is a substantive conclusion, and it
needs to be defended in substantive terms; in the absence of such
argument, Feinberg's analysis begs an important question. Intuitively, it
seems clear that if A acts and thereby adversely affects B' s self-interest,
she has harmed B, whether or not she acted faultily or violated one of

4.

FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 6.
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B's rights. Fault or a rights violation may well be a necessary condition
of moral blameworthiness on A's part, or of her civil or criminal liability
at law, but there does not seem to be any basis for saying that in their
absence A did not, in fact, harm B.
In this Article, I shall therefore focus on Feinberg's conditions 1 and
4. It should be noted that condition 4 speaks of an adverse effect on "B's
self-interest," as though B has just one interest at stake. The reason
Feinberg phrases the point this way would appear to be the following.
Although he states earlier in his article that "[t]he term 'interests' is best
left undefined here, except to say that interests are distinguishable
components of a person's good or well-being," 5 he immediately goes on
to say that "our concepts seem to commit us to the view that interests
can be summed up or integrated into one emergent personal interest."6
This last point, however, is far from evident, and in Part IV, I shall argue
that it is mistaken. Condition 2 should therefore be reformulated to
speak simply of an adverse effect on "one of B's interests" rather than on
"B' s self-interest."
This brings us to a crucial point, which is that, in Feinberg' s view, the
analysis of "A harms B" as thus far presented is incomplete. We also
need, as an independent requirement for the occurrence of harm, the so
called counterfactual condition:
6 . B's personal interest is in a worse condition (usually but not always lower on
the interest graph) than it would be in had A not acted as he did.7

Feinberg distinguishes the counterfactual test from the worsening test,
which is not, he says, always required for an act of harming. The
worsening test can be expressed as follows:
6X. B's personal interest is in a worse condition (lower on the interest graph)
than it was before A acted. 8

For purposes of clarity, I will refer to what Feinberg calls the
worsening test as the "historical worsening test." As Feinberg notes, the
counterfactual test and the historical worsening test do not amount to the
same thing. Feinberg does not use this kind of example, but consider an
instance of concurrent causation, such as occurred in the famous case of
Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. :9 Two separately
started fires joined and burned down the plaintiff's house, where either

5.

6.
7.
8.

9.

1 286

!d. at 4.
!d.
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10
fire would have been sufficient by itself to bring about that result.
Suppose A started one of the fires. Assuming (as seems inevitable) that
both fires are causes of the house burning down, A causally contributed
to the histmical worsening of B' s interest in his house. (For present
purposes, we do not need to specify exactly what the nature of that
interest is.) The historical worsening test is thus satisfied. But the
counterfactual test is not satisfied, because the house would have been
burned down anyway by the other fire. Since Feinberg makes the
counterfactual test rather than the historical worsening test the touchstone
of harm, it would seem that, on Feinberg' s view, A has not harmed B.
Feinberg uses the following example to show that the counterfactual
test can be satisfied even when the historical worsening test is not.
Imagine that B is a model who is wrongfully detained by A and thereby
prevented from taking part in the Miss America Pageant. If she had
been able to enter the contest, B would have won a million dollars.
Feinberg holds that B's condition has not been historically worsened,
"because she is no worse off than before the detention." 11 But because
she is worse off than she would have been if she had not been detained,
the counterfactual test is satisfied, and she is harmed. Feinberg in fact
argues that sometimes A can harm B even though A not only did not
historically worsen B's condition but actually bettered it. Feinberg asks
us to imagine that doctor A treats B, her patient, and improves his
condition, but because she was negligent she did not improve it as much
as she should have done. Although A bettered B' s condition in an
historical sense, Feinberg claims that A harmed B because the
counterfactual condition has been violated: B is worse off than he would
have been had A behaved as she ought to have done (as she had a duty to
do). As Feinberg remarks in a footnote, this example only shows what
he wants it to show if condition 6 is revised to hold that B's condition is
in a worse state than it would have been in if A had acted as she should
have done, rather than if she had not acted as she did. I will return to
this kind of case at the end of this Part.
In light of the above considerations, let me reformulate Feinberg's
analysis of A' s harming B along the following lines:

1 0.

1 1.

/d. at 9 1 4.
FEINBERG, supra note 2, at 7 .
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(1 ) A acts (in a sense wide enough to include omissions and extended

sequences of activity).
(2) A's action is a cause of an adverse effect on one of B' s interests
(a "state of harm").
(3) B's personal interest is in a worse condition (usually but not
always lower on the interest graph) than it would be had A not
acted as he did ("the counterfactual condition").
Floating in the background somewhere, but apparently not a part of
the analysis, we have:
(3X) B's personal interest is in a worse condition (lower on the

interest graph) than it was in before A acted ("the worsening
condition").
I mention, in passing, that it is not entirely clear what the relationship
is supposed to be between conditions 2 and 3. Does condition 2 require
an actual historical worsening, where we must then look to condition 3
to determine if that worsening was "harm"? This does not seem consistent
with Feinberg's understanding of the Miss America example (or, for that
matter, with the words "a state of harm" that he places in parentheses to
describe condition 2). Probably the better view is that conditions 3 and
3 X are meant to be alternative interpretations of condition 2, where
Feinberg himself favors condition 3 as the preferable interpretation.
Henceforth, when I refer to Feinberg's analysis of harming, it will be
to this reformulated version, involving conditions 1 through 3 .
Feinberg considers a possible problem to which the counterfactual test
might be thought to give rise. The standard hypothetical of the doomed
airplane helps to make this problem clear. B gets in A's taxicab to be
driven to the airport. En route, A drives negligently and hits another car.
B breaks his leg in the accident and as a result misses his flight. The
plane that B missed crashes soon after takeoff, and all aboard are killed.
It is as certain as anything can be that had B caught the flight, he too
would have been killed. Feinberg asks if A harmed B by negligently
causing his leg to be broken. He concedes that while common sense
seems to say yes, his analysis appears to say no. Applying the
counterfactual test, B's overall interests would not only have been not
better served on balance had A driven his cab carefully, they would in
fact have been worsened (because B would have been dead).
Feinberg considers the possibility that the way to deal with this and
related difficulties might be to replace condition 3 in his analysis, which
is the counterfactual test, with a disjunctive condition consisting of
conditions 3 and 3X. Thus A harms B, as a result of an act by A, only if
either B' s condition is historically worsened by the act or B is worse off

1 28 8
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than he would have been had A not acted. But Feinberg does not think
that this disjunctive solution will work either. Suppose, he suggests, that
A's gang abducts B the day before the Miss America Pageant, thus
preventing B from participating and thereby winning a million dollars.
However, if A's gang had not abducted her, then C's gang, in a
completely independent operation, would have done so. Feinberg argues
that the historical worsening test is not met for the reason that he gave in
the earlier variant of this example, namely, because B is no worse off
historically after the abduction than she was before. But the counterfactual
condition is also not met: B is not worse off than she would have been
had A not abducted her, because if A had not done so, then C would
have. Feinberg thinks it is nonetheless intuitively obvious that B was
harmed in this example.
Although he is not entirely clear about this, Feinberg's response to
these difficulties is apparently to reject the disjunctive solution and to
retain the counterfactual condition, namely condition 3, as the
touchstone of when one person has caused another person harm.
Feinberg believes that the doomed airplane case and the second Miss
America case have a common structure. A first harmer, H1, puts V in a
worse position for a period of time t. After t, a second harmer, H2 would
have caused equal or greater harm. H1 is V' s actual harmer, "partly in
virtue of his satisfying the counterfactual condition for time t."12 But,
Feinberg asks, consider the case in which V' s injuries linger on after t;
for example, the would-be airline passenger's leg is still broken even
after the plane has crashed. Feinberg assumes that the law would
nonetheless permit the passenger to recover compensation even for the
injury after time t, and comments as follows:
The law, I think, implicitly assumes a distinction between the harm actually
caused to V by H1 on balance (which is determined in part by the counterfactual
test) and the harm that H1 is justly answerable for. The harmful state that V
remains in is a kind of "causal residue" directly resulting from the harm that H1
did cause. It is unquestionably a harmful condition but strictly speaking after the
passage of interval t, it is not a harmed condition, that is, not a net harm produced
by H1's act of harming. Neve1theless, it is perfectly just to hold H1 liable for the
full damages, including those beyond what he actually caused, because only an
unforeseeable fluke of chance (e.g., a plane crash) accounts for the brevity of the
period during which the counterfactual condition continued to be satisfied. In
short, H1 hmmed V because there was some period, however brief, during which
the counterfactual condition was satisfied, and he is justly answerable for the

12.

Id. at 1 0 .
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effects of the harm he originally caused, since it was only a fluke of, chance, not
3
anything he can claim credit for, that limited the scope of his harming.1

Feinberg may or may not be right about the justice of H1 's
compensating V . That is a question to which I shall return in Part V.
But I believe the details of his account are nonetheless mistaken. As an
aside, I note that it is very difficult to see how Feinberg would apply his
own solution to the variant Miss America problem, because it is not
clear that, by Feinberg's own lights, B was worse off, between the time
of A's abduction and the time that C' s abduction would have taken
14
place, than she would have been if A had not abducted her.
For the
moment, however, let us leave Miss America to one side and focus
instead on the doomed airplane hypothetical. Feinberg might be taken to
be suggesting, in the above passage, that H1 did not cause the harmful
condition from which V was still suffering at time t and following. That
would be a very strong claim, and a very implausible one on any
acceptable theory of causation. But how else are we to construe
Feinberg's argument? Perhaps the clue resides in the claim tha.t there
was no net harm. This claim is presumably based on Feinberg's thesis,
mentioned earlier, that all interests can be "summed up or integrated into
one emergent personal interest." I shall argue in Part IV that there is no
good reason to accept this thesis, but even if it were correct, the result
would surely be that H1 has not harmed V at all, not just that he has not
harmed him after time t. The plus to be weighed against the minus of
B' s broken leg is, after all, the saving of his life. So long as we accept a
counterfactual rather than an historical worsening interpretation of harm
(condition 3 rather than 3 X), there does not seem to be any good reason
to limit the "netting out" effect, if there is one, to time t and after. While
it is true that there is a period between the time when the leg was broken
and the time of the crash during which it would be possible to say that,
applying the counterfactual criterion to that period only, V was worse
off, it is not clear why we should limit the application of the test during
this period to that period. Given that the counterfactual test is not an
historical test, why should it not be applied on an ali-in basis which takes
account of everything that would have happened if H1 had not acted as
he did? Even at a time after the accident but before the crash, is V not
better off, counterfactually speaking, than he would have been if H had
not negligently caused the accident?
1 3. Id. at 10-1 1 .
1 4. It is not entirely clear what Feinberg thinks the harm consists of in this
example. The most plausible candidates are not being able to enter the pageant, being
prevented from winning the pageant, and being prevented from collecting the million
dollars. All of these events, we can assume, take place after the time that C' s abduction
would have taken place.

1 290

Harm, History, and Counterfactuals

[VOL. 40: 1 283, 2003]

SA.N

DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Even if I am wrong to conclude that Feinberg's reliance on interest
summing and netting-out is, in each case, problematic, there are other
difficulties with his counterfactual account of harm. Consider a variant
on the Kingston case discussed above. Suppose that A sets a fire which
burns down B's house.15 There is another fire that would have burned
down the house if A 's fire had not already done so, but it is prevented
from having that effect because A's fire consumed some of the fuel that
lies between the second fire and the house. It turns out that, if A's fire
had not existed, the second fire would have reached B's house at the
exact moment when, in fact, A's fire did. Thus, there is no period t
during which it is possible to say that B was (counterfactually) worse off
than if A had not set the fire. According to Feinberg's account, A did not
harm B. But this seems plainly wrong. Perhaps A does not have to
compensate B for the harm he caused, but that is another question. It
seems indisputable that, in burning down B's house, A caused B harm,
and that this is true even if the same kind of harm, in the same degree,
would have been caused at the exact same time by some other fire had
A's fire not existed.
I have concentrated so far on cases in which the counterfactual
understanding of harm would lead us to say that there is no harm but
where, intuitively, harm exists. But there are also many cases in which
the counterfactual understanding would lead us to say that there is harm
where, intuitively, there is none. This is because, as Shiffrin points out,
a pure counterfactual account of harm does not, and cannot, draw any
distinction between harming and failing to benefit.16 I am not harmed
just because, were things different in some relevant way, I would have
been better off than I am now.
The solution to all these various difficulties is, I think, the following.
Instead of analyzing harm by reference to the counterfactual condition
(condition 3 ), we should analyze it by reference to the historical
worsening condition (condition 3 X). Our concept of harm is such that
harm only occurs if there is an actual worsening, that is, an historical
setback to an interest: If B was harmed, then there must be some relevant
interest of B' s that was initially at level n and that was caused by the
15.

A harmed

I note in passing that, for the reasons discussed earlier, the question of whether

B does not seem to depend on whether or not A acted wrongfully in setting the
fire, although of course the question of whether A owes B compensation might well so
depend.

1 6.

Shiffrin, supra note

3, at 1 2 1 .
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allegedly harmful event to be at a level below n. I should note immediately
that I am putting this requirement forward as a necessary condition for
the occurrence of harm. I am not suggesting that it is a suffi cient condition.
Why, it might be asked, should we not adopt a conjunctive solution,
according to which A harmed B only if both conditions 3 and 3 X are
met? Perhaps we might say, using the variant of Kingston just discussed,
that the historical worsening caused by A's fire was "protoharm," but
because the counterfactual condition was not met, B did not suffer harm
in the true or full sense. The answer to this suggestion has to be, I
believe, that it simply does not conform to our ordinary concept of harm.
Our ordinary concept is relatively minimalist. What I have called
protoharm just is harm; no further adornment is required to turn it into
the real thing. Of course, there are further interesting questions about
responsibility and liability for harm caused, and the answers to these
questions can be quite nuanced. For example, the law accepts that whether
or not A owes B compensation in the variant Kingston hypothetical just
discussed depends on whether or not the second fire was set tortiously.
If it was set tortiously, then A owes compensation even though the
counterfactual condition has apparently not been met. 17 I will suggest in
Part V that the law is correct on this point, and if that is so, then
Feinberg's counterfactual analysis of harm would presumably have to be
revised or qualified in some way. The main point for present purposes,
however, is that whether or not the law is right here, it is surely a
mistake to fold these difficult questions of moral and legal responsibility
into the concept of harm itself. The paradigm of harm is an historical
worsening. Once we have established that A caused B harm in this sense
then further questions of responsibility and liability arise, and these
might well involve counterfactual analysis. But these questions are
distinct from the determination of whether or not harm occurred in the
.
1
18
f 1rst p ace.
What are we to say, then, of Feinberg' s Miss America hypothetical?
In both its versions (one abductor in the first variant, one abductor and
another waiting in the wings, in the second), Feinberg maintains that B,
the abductee, suffered no historical worsening; she is no worse off after
the abduction than she was before. Feinberg thinks that she suffered
harm in both variants because she is worse off counterfactually; if she
had not been abducted, she would have won the contest and a million
dollars. But Feinberg is wrong to suggest that there has been no
1 7 . This is, at least, the law according to Kingston itself. Kingston v. Chi. & N.W.
2 1 1 N.W. 9 1 3 ,9 1 4- 1 5 (Wis. 1 927).
1 8 . There are some limited exceptions to this generalization, such that the moral
quality of the act leading to harm affects the character and extent of the harm itself. I
Ry.,

will discuss such cases later in this Part.

1 29 2
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historical worsening here. A deprived B, the would-be Miss America, of
an option or an opportunity to enter the pageant, and such a deprivation
19 The
is a setback to her autonomy of a kind that constitutes harm.
failure to win the contest and the million dollars are instances of
consequential damage flowing from this initial harm. I do not think it
matters in this regard that A violated a right of B' s (by wrongfully
0
detaining her) ?
Suppose instead that he had innocently and
nonnegligently misdirected her, telling her that the pageant was in
Atlantic City when for some obscure and generally unknown reason it
was being held that year in Houston. I believe the proper conclusion is
that A (innocently) caused B harm, because, again, A interfered with B's
autonomy by depriving her of a valuable option or opportunity. He
induced B to rely on the assumption that the pageant was in Atlantic City
and, accordingly, to behave in a way that eliminated her option of
getting to Houston, where the pageant was actually to take place. The
loss of the relevant option flows from B's detrimental reliance. It is
possible that there are contextual limits on the manner in which A can
affect B' s options and still be said to have harmed her. For example,
suppose that A did not innocently direct B away from the pageant but
instead cancelled the entire affair the year that B was hoping to enter. (A
was the pageant's CEO, if there is such a person, and he acted
justifiably, for reasons relating to the pageant's shaky finances.) A has
still deprived B of the option of entering the pageant, but it is not entirely
clear that B has been harmed here, at least in the way that she would
1 9 . Cj: JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 41 3 ( 1 986). In his comment on
this Article, John Goldberg seems to assume that I am committed to treating "lost
expectancies," meaning interferences with the expectation interest in contract law, as a
subcategory of lost opportunities. See John C.P. Goldberg, Harm, Injwy, and Proximate
Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1315, 1 328 -29 (2003 ). But this is a misunderstanding. In
the case of a lost opportunity, A has done something (detained B, induced B to rely to her
detriment, etc.) such that B no longer has an option to do something which she had
before A acted. Interferences with the expectation interest in contract law can involve
the loss of an opportunity in this sense, but they need not. Rather, an interference with
the expectation interest constitutes the violation of a cettain kind of right, and, as we
shall see in Part IV. the violation of a right does not necessarily involve either an
intetference with autonomy (the deprivation of an option) or, indeed, harm of any kind.
Conversely. intetferences with autonomy do not necessarily amount to the violation of a
right. Consider the case in the text in which A innocently misdirects B to Atlantic City,
thereby depriving her of the option of getting to Houston and entering the pageant there.
A has interfered with B's autonomy, but it would not be plausible to say that he has
violated one of her rights.
20. Such a detention is, of course, harm in itself, partly but not entirely because it
constitutes an interference with autonomy.
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have been harmed by being prevented from entering a contest that was in
fact being held and that others were free to enter. This seems to be the
case even if, as a counterfactual matter, B would have won the pageant
had it in fact been held. But this is a speculative point, and nothing turns
on it for subsequent purposes.
As we saw at the outset, Feinberg is concerned to analyze the notion
of "A harming B" rather than the notion of "harm" as such. I have
already suggested that his original conditions 2, 3, and 5, which were
concerned with the moral character of A's act (was it faulty, a rights
violation, excused or justified, and so on), are irrelevant to the
characterization of the outcome for B as harm. I now wish to suggest,
along much the same lines, that the requirement of human agency in
Feinberg's conditions 1 and 2 (on the slimmed-down version of
Feinberg's analysis that I presented earlier) is similarly irrelevant.
Condition 1 holds that A acted (or in a suitable sense omitted to act),
while condition 2 holds that A's action is the cause of an adverse effect
on one of B' s interests. On the minimalist, historical analysis of harm
that I have suggested lies at the core of our ordinary concept, the gist of
harm is the historical worsening of one of B's interests. Such a
worsening is the result of a causal process; it is an event that has been
precipitated by other events. In general, there is no reason to think that
the analysis of harm changes in any significant way if one of the
1
precipitating events was an instance of human agency? There is no
reason, in other words, to think that the relational notion of "A harms B"
is morally richer or more complicated than the conjunction of the
concept of harm and the concept of agency. Harm is a moral concept, in
the sense that we require moral argument to establish what is and is not
harm, but I think the relevant moral argument is for the most part limited
to what happens and does not extend to how it happens.
On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that there is no distinct
relational moral category of the kind Feinberg apparently sets out to
describe. This means that there is no general moral category that takes
the form "A harms B." But it does not follow that there cannot be
special kinds of harm that can only be caused by human actions. For
example, it is plausible to think that the p1imary manner in which

2 1 . Andrew Simester made the point in his comments at the Oxford Jurisprudence
Colloquium that it seems odd to say that a person has been harmed by nature, as opposed
to having been harmed by another person. It is no doubt true that the subject of the verb
"to harm'' is usually a phrase referring to a person, and perhaps it does seem somewhat
stilted to say that a storm, say, harmed someone. But I think there are many other
locutions that are perfectly natural and that make clear that it is not just human agency
that can cause harm. I think it is quite appropriate, for example, to say that someone
suffered harm during a hurricane.
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dignitary interests are set back involves the deliberate actions of others.
It is no doubt true that one's dignity can be adversely affected in many
different ways, but there nonetheless seems to be a distinctive kind of
harm that is suffered when one is subjected to deliberate indignity by
another person. R.A. Duff has argued along similar lines that the
primary harm associated with rape is internal to the act of rape:
"[E]ssential to the description and identification of the harm as a harm is
22 The harm in such cases
a human action which perpetrates it."
presumably consists partly in the interference with autonomy, bodily
integrity, and emotional well-being, and partly in the fact that this state
of affairs was brought about intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by
another human being. 23 The general point to be emphasized for present
purposes, however, is that most harms are not like this. A broken leg is
a broken leg, and this is true even if the leg was broken as a result of
another person's agency.
The upshot of the discussion so far, then, is that the core characteristic
of harm, and a necessary condition of the occurrence of harm, is the
historical worsening condition:
HWC: A person has been harmed only if some relevant interest of
that person has been affected adversely, meaning the interest has been
caused to worsen or deteriorate in time.
Let me add three quick points of clarification. First, the HWC claims
that all harms are historical setbacks to interests. It does not follow,
however, that all historical setbacks to interests are harms. That is why I
22. R.A. Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 76,
90 ( 1 989); see also R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1 1 1-1 5 ( 1 990) [hereinafter DUFF,
CRIMINAL LIABILITY).
23 . In John Goldberg's comment on this Article, he apparently takes me to be
saying that any rights violation is a harm of this special kind. See Goldberg, supra note
1 9, at 1 3 1 9 . But this is a misunderstanding. In my view, this special kind of harm-to
use Goldberg's helpful terminology, "relational" or "dyadic'' harm, which is to be
contrasted with the usual case of "monadic" harm, see id.-involves interference with a
particular class of interests, of which dignity is the main (and perhaps only) instance.
The harm in rape is relational rather than monadic because an interest of this sort was
adversely affected (along with other interests, of course). Perhaps relational harms are
usually rights violations, but the two categories do not coincide, and neither is a subset of
the other. Note that while it is true that a right can only be violated by a person, it does
not follow that the harm (if any) which is associated with a rights violation must be of a
kind that can only be caused by human action. I further discuss the relationship between
harm and rights in Pan IV.
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have formulated the HWC in terms of relevant interests rather than just
interests. I will return to this point later. The second point is one that I
mentioned at the beginning of this Article. While I have rejected the
claim that harm should be understood by reference, in whole or in part,
to the counterfactual condition, this does not mean that a counterfactual
inquiry has no place in determining whether or not harm has occurred.
Harm is the result of a causal process, and the correct analysis of
causation might well require us to engage in counterfactual inquiry in
order to determine what is a cause of what.24 But even if it is true that
we have to employ counterfactuals to characterize properly the causation
of a harmful event, the determination that the event was a hannful one
does not depend on counterfactual inquiry. It depends, rather, on an
historical comparison of before and after. The third point is that even if
a counterfactual analysis does not figure in the determination of whether
an event was harmful, it might well figure, as has already been noted, in
the quantification of damages in tort law. I discuss this issue in Part V.
As I have characterized the historical worsening account, it does not
require a particular account of causation, but it does require that harm
have been brought about by a causal process. I have further argued that
the harmful character of the end result is determined historically rather
than counterfactually. Now it is true that one could offer a mixed
account of harm, by which I mean an account that requires harm to be
the outcome of a causal process but that determines the harmful character
of the end result by means of a counterfactual inquiry. As a general matter,
however, this grouping of caused event and counterfactual characterization
of harm seems quite artificial. It seems designed simply to get around
the fact that a pure counterfactual analysis of harm-that is, one that
compares the current state of affairs to what would or should have
happened, without inquiring into how the current state of affairs came
about-will be completely incapable, without more, of distinguishing a
harm from a failure to benefit. The more natural correlation would seem
to be between the requirement that there be a causal process and the
characterization of the end result of that process as harmful because it
was an historical worsening. This is more natural because an historical
24. As was noted earlier, Michael Moore makes a very strong case for the view
that causation is not properly understood simply by reference to a counterfactual test.
See supra note l. In my view, the best analysis of causation is given by what Richard
Wright has called the NESS test: A cause is a Necessary, i.e. nonredundant Element of a
Sufficient Set, meaning a set of conditions minimally sufficient to bring about the effect
in question. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 73 5 , 1 774
( 1985). This understanding of causation is based on the idea of instantiating a causal
l aw. It does not reduce causation to a counterfactual test, but counterfactual inquiry will
nonetheless be involved in determining whether a particular chain of events is or is not
an instantiation of some causal law.
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worsening just is a certain kind of causal process. The requirement of a
causal process has not, as with the mixed account, been tacked on to an
otherwise self-sufficient and freestanding account of harm, namely, the
pure counterfactual approach, simply to avoid certain counterintuitive
consequences.
In arguing for the historical worsening condition, I have pointed out
what I take to be serious difficulties for an understanding of harm based
on the counterfactual condition. This is not to say, of course, that an
understanding based on the historical condition is without problems of
its own. In the remainder of this Part, I would like to discuss some
difficult cases that have been drawn to my attention by commentators.
First, consider the case of a preconception tort, in which someone does
something to the body of a woman who is likely to become a mother that
has the effect, when she subsequently becomes pregnant, of preventing
the fetus from developing two arms.25 Intuitively this appears to be a
case of harm, even though there is no obvious historical worsening.
(The fetus never lost an arm; it only had one from the outset.) Consider
also a case in which someone acts in such a way as to prevent someone

25. This hypothetical is based on, but different from, one posed by John Goldberg
in his comment. See Goldberg, supra note 1 9 , at 1 329 -30. In the Goldberg variation, a
couple unreasonably fails to take a pill that, if taken within a few hours before or after
sexual i ntercourse, would have prevented a birth defect in their child. I have not used
Goldberg's hypothetical because it contains a complication, namely, the question of
whether the birth defect is the result of an act or an omission, that somewhat obscures
our intuitions. If the defect is properly described as the result of an omission, then I do
not think it is appropriately described as harm. This is because pure omissions cannot, in
my view, be causes, whereas harms are always the result of a causal process. On the
question of omissions as causes, see Moore, supra note 1 , at 1 222-26 ; Michael S.
Moore, Causation and Responsibility, Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y, Summer 1 999, at 1 , 23-24,
3 1 -34. As Moore argues, the relata in causal statements are events, not facts, and while
an omission is a fact, it is not an event. It is worth noting that if one adopted the contrary
view. namely that omissions can be causes (at least i n cases where the omitted act could
have prevented harm or conferred a benefit), and combined it with a full-fledged
counterfactual analysis of harm, the distinction between harming and fai ling to benefit
would disappear completely, even on what I called in the text a mixed account of harm.
This might not be an argument in itself against the conclusion that omissions can be
causes, but it is an unsettling result. None of this is meant to deny, of course, that we can
have affirmative duties to bling about certain states of affairs and that we can properly be
labeled responsible for failing to bring about those states of affairs. Sometimes such
failures will involve harm, as, for example, when the right holder relies to her detriment
on the expectation that the other party will act in accordance with his duty. Often,
however, the breach of an affirmative duty will simply amount to a failure to confer a
benefit. See further supra note 1 9 and the discussion at the end of Part IV.
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else from recovering from an injury or a disease.26 Intuitively this too
appears to be a case of harm, but again there seems to be no historical
worsening.
The counterfactual approach could explain why there is harm in these
cases, but I believe the general difficulties with that approach make it
too unattractive a solution to adopt on even an ad hoc basis. I am far
from certain what the correct analysis of such cases is, but I would like
to suggest very tentatively that they may, despite initial appearances, in
fact be instances of historical worsenings. The first point to be noted is
that both cases involve a causal process. The second is that that process
affects what might be called a natural potential. In the one case we have
the natural potential and tendency of a fetus to develop, in the absence of
external interference, two arms, and in the other we have the natural
potential and tendency of the body to heal itself, again in the absence of
external interference. If this potential is absent in either case, it seems
clear that there is no harm. In both cases, the being who has been affected
can be said to have an interest in the realization of the relevant potential.
(I am assuming for present purposes that a fetus has interests.) I
acknowledge that the idea that harm can take the form of interference
with a potential is slippery ground, because it might easily slide into a
mixed counterfactual account of the kind discussed earlier. It would be
easy to make this slide because in any case where a person would
have been better off in the absence of a specified causal process, it is
presumably possible to say that there has been interference with some
kind of "potential." It would be implausible to claim that all such
interferences are harm. However, once we introduce the idea of a
potential it might be difficult to avoid biting that particular bullet, and
once the bullet has been bitten it would be implausible to claim that the
harmful character of every such interference depends on an historical
rather than a counterfactual inquiry. In order to characterize interference
with a natural potential as an historical worsening, I think that much
must therefore rest on the idea that the potential is a natural one,
27
meaning one that inheres in the nature of the being affected. I am not
sure at the moment how to develop this idea further; as I said earlier, this
general approach to the problem cases is offered only tentatively.
26. Cases of this kind were pointed out to me independently by Richard Arneson
and Tony Honore.
27. As was noted in P art II, Feinberg believes that a doctor who improves the
condition of a patient, but not as much as she should have done, has harmed the patient.
In my opinion, this is not a case of harm but rather a failure to confer a benefit. It does
not matter, for purposes of this analysis, that the doctor was under a duty to confer the
benefit. I am assuming that the doctor did not impede a natural potential to recover, but
simply failed to make things better in a situation where they would not have gotten better
on their own. See further supra note 25.
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III. S HIF FRIN ' S CRITIQUE OF THE COMPARATIVE MODEL
Both Feinberg's counterfactual analysis of harm and the historical
worsening account depend on a comparison between two states of
affairs. The former compares what has happened with what would have
happened, while the latter compares what has happened with the status
quo ante. Seana Shiffrin takes both types of account to be particular
versions of what she calls the "comparative" model of harm, and she
offers a critique of that model which she maintains applies to both
versions. She takes Feinberg's analysis of harm as her primary target,
but insofar as the problems she discerns with the comparative model
flow from comparison tout court, rather than from counterfactual
comparison in particular, the critique is prima facie applicable to the
historical worsening account as well. Shiffrin describes the comparative
model in the following terms:
[M]any regard h arms and benefits as though they represent two ends of a scale,
like the scale of positive and negative numbers. Benefits are thought to be just
l ike h arms, except that harms are bad and benefits are good. On Feinberg's
natural and attractive interpretation of this symmetrical picture, harms involve
the setback of one's interests, whereas benefits involve the advancement of
one's interests along a sliding scale of promotion and decline. To evaluate
whether an event has benefited or harmed a person, one compares, with respect
to the fulfillment of his interests, either his beginning and his end points
(historical models), or his end point and where he would have been otherwise
(counterfactual models). If he has ascended the scale (either relative to his
beginning point or alternative position), then he has been benefitted (sic]. If he
moves down, then he has been harmed. Either way, one arrives at an all-things
considered judgment that either harm or benefit (but not both) has been bestowed.
Thus, because he has been overall benefited, he has not been harmed.28

Shiffrin argues that there are many problems with the comparative
model, thus understood. First, it fails to explain certain "deep asymmetries"
between benefit and harm. Shiffrin claims that we often look upon failing
to be benefited as morally and substantively less serious than both being
harmed and being saved from harm. She notes that this asymmetry is
impossible to make sense of on a counterfactual model, but that even on
an historical model the distance between the start and end points may be
too small to explain the asymmetry properly. Second, either the historical
or the counterfactual version of a comparative account will have to say
that persons who have been moved to status x from different ends of the
scale have been benefited or harmed respectively, regardless of their
28.

Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 12 1 (footnote omitted).
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starting points. Suppose A is (or would otherwise have been) at x 2,
and is moved to x. B, on the other hand, is (or would otherwise have
been) at x + 2, and is also moved to x . The comparative model is
committed to saying that A has been benefited and B harmed, even
though they are now identically situated. Because of what she takes to
be the asymmetry of benefits and harms, Shiffrin regards this as a
problematic outcome. It would be even more problematic, she believes,
if A is moved from x 4 to x 3, whereas B is moved from x + 2 to x +
1 . In this hypothetical, the comparative model tells us that A is benefited
and B harmed, even though B is better off, all things considered, than A.
"If this were so, why should harm, per se, in this sense, be a special
subject of moral concern and have greater priority than failures to be
29
benefited ?"
Shiffrin offers a number of other criticisms of the comparative model
of harm, but all of them are related to her central thesis that that model
cannot explain the asymmetry that she says exists between harms and
benefits. She therefore offers a rival account of harm, the most
significant aspect of which is its noncomparative character:
-

-

-

Typically, harm involves the imposition of a state or condition that directly or
indirectly obstructs, prevents, frustrates, or undoes an agent' s cognizant
interaction with her circumstances and her efforts to fashion a life within them
that is distinctively and authentically hers . . . . To be harmed primarily involves the
imposition of conditions from which the person undergoing them is reasonably
alienated or which are strongly at odds with the conditions she would rationally
will . . . . On this view, pain counts as a harm because it exerts an insi stent,
intrusive, and unpleasant presence on one ' s consciousness that one must j ust
undergo and endure. Disabilities, injured limbs, and illnesses also qualify as
harms. They forcibly impose experiential conditions that are affirmatively contrary
to one ' s w i l l ; al s o, they impede s i gnificantly one' s c apacities for act i ve
agency . . . . Death, too, unless rationally willed, seriously interferes with the
exercise of agency. 30

I should note, to begin, that I have some doubts about Shiffrin ' s
introduction into her account of the idea that harm consists of conditions
that are, inter alia, ones from which one is alienated or which one did not
or would not rationally will. This strikes me as problematic for the
reason that it makes harm potentially too subjective a notion. If, for
whatever reason, one is not alienated from a condition that would
otherwise count as harm, or if one rationally willed the condition (say,
via consent), should we therefore conclude that the person is not
suffering harm? My inclination is to say no; while one can consent to
29. /d. at 1 22. Shiffrin notes that a loss as such can be a morallv significant
harm
�
if there were an expectation or personal investment involved, but arg�es, correctly, that
the comparati ve model does not make anything turn on the fact of expectation or
investment. !d.
30.
!d. at 1 23-24 .
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1
harm, such consent does not (except in special cases) 3 transform the
harmful condition into a nonharmful one. I will say no more about this
issue here, however. My primary concern is not with Shiffrin's
alternative account of harm as such, but rather with its relevance to her
critique of the comparative model.
In the displayed passage quoted above, Shiffrin seems to use the term
"imposed" in two different ways. Early in the passage she writes that
" [t]o be harmed primarily involves the imposition of conditions from
which the person undergoing them is reasonably alienated." This suggests,
to my mind, that what is being imposed are such conditions as a
disability, an injured limb, or an illness. Because these conditions would
presumably be "imposed" by means of a causal mechanism, this
understanding of "imposition" is completely consistent with the historical
worsening condition. Later in the passage, however, Shiffrin speaks of
disabilities, injured limbs, and illnesses as themselves imposing
experiential conditions that are affirmatively contrary to one's will. This
suggests that, on Shiffrin's view, disabilities, injured limbs, and other
harms are simply conditions, meaning states of being that involve or lead
to (impose) further, experiential conditions such as unpleasant mental
states or a subnormal capacity for agency. To count as harm, these
states of being need not have come about as the result of any historical
worsening. On this view, a disability or an illness with which one was
born is just as much a harm as a disability or an illness that befell one
during one's lifetime.
I am not sure which of these two senses of "imposition" Shiffrin
would accept as giving the appropriate content to her affirmative account
of harm. I believe, however, that the correct approach would be to
incorporate the historical worsening condition into the account, thereby
treating harms as states or events that are "imposed" in the sense that
they are historical worsenings that were caused by prior states or events.
Shiffrin seems to assume that the historical version of the comparative
model must treat any worsening of an interest as a harm (and any
improvement as a benefit). This does seem to be Feinberg's position (at
least in the sense that the process of "netting out" takes account of all
setbacks to interests on the minus side, and of all advancements on the
3 1 . The kind of special case I have in mind would be the h arm that Duff argues is
associated with rape; unlike most harms, this harm is integrally bound up with the human
action that created it. See DUFF, CRIMINAL LIABILITY, supra note 22, at 1 1 1 - 1 2 . B ut if
the sexual act is in fact consented to, then the harm in question does not exist at all .
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plus side). But comparative models are not, in general, committed to
that idea. The historical worsening account need only say that a
worsening is a necessary condition of harm, not a sufficient condition. It
is perfectly consistent with such an account that harms, to be harms,
must also meet other conditions, such as, for example, those set out in
Shiffrin's own affirmative analysis (that the worsened state be such that
one is alienated from it or be unable rationally to will it).
Shiffrin argues that "we often consider failing to be benefited as
morally and significantly less serious than both being harmed and not
being saved from harm." 32 She notes, correctly, that counterfactual
comparison models of harm cannot distinguish at all between harming
and failing to benefit. She further notes, again correctly, that historical
comparison models do have the resources to draw this distinction, but
goes on to argue that "the distance between the end points that make it a
harm rather than a failure to be benefited may be rather too small to
account for the strength of our asymmetrical reactions." 33 The point
here would seem to be that the setbacks to interests that we regard as
harms are often more serious than failures to confer a benefit because
harms, unlike the general category of failing to benefit, necessarily
involve particularly serious evils, such as illness or personal injury. I do
not think that this conceptual claim is correct, but even if it is, we could,
as was noted in the preceding paragraph, respond to the concern by
supplementing the historical worsening condition rather than by
rejecting it; we could insist that there are other necessary conditions that
must be met before harm can be said to occur. Again, one possibility is
Shiffrin's own affirmative analysis, although for the reasons stated
earlier I have some doubts about the viability of that approach. It should
also be noted that while we have or should have the same level of moral
concern about serious evils like illness even when they do not come
about as a result of an historical worsening (for example, when they
involve congenital conditions), it does not follow that such evils simply
are harms in the absence of an historical worsening.
As I have already noted, the historical worsening model of harm is not
committed to the view that all historical worsenings are harms. Even
while conceding that point, though, I think Shiffrin's case against the
comparison model in general (and hence the historical worsening model
in particular) is overstated. Consider her argument about two persons, A
and B, who are both moved to interest level x, where the former was
previously at level x
2, while the latter was at level x + 2. The
comparative model is committed, Shiffrin says, to saying that A has been
-

32.
33.
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benefited and B harmed, even though the two are now identically
situated. But what is so obviously problematic about saying that?
Suppose that A was suffering from a severe form of schizophrenia, while
B was suffering from a mild form. Someone has done something to A to
alleviate her condition somewhat, while someone else has done
something to B to worsen his, so that they are now suffering from the
disease to more or less the same degree. Is it not correct to say that B
was harmed while A was benefited? Shiffrin asks, " [W]hy should harm,
per se, in this sense [that is, in the comparative sense] , be a special
subject of moral concern and have greater priority than failures to be
benefited?"34 It is not entirely clear to me, however, that harm does have
greater priority just because it is harm. What has priority, in the sense I
think Shiffrin has in mind, is the existence of certain evils, which may or
may not be associated with harm. It is also worth noting that there is, of
course, another source of moral concern in the worsening of B's
condition, and that is the fact that it flowed from an act rather than an
omission (or, perhaps, from a "doing" rather than an "allowing"). I
believe that distinctions of this kind are doing far more work in our
intuitions than Shiffrin acknowledges.
Whether or not we accept Shiffrin' s particular account of harm as
involving a condition from which one is alienated or which one could
not rationally will, we still must ask whether or not a philosophical
account of harm should limit the historical worsenings that count as
harm to those that involve such discrete and serious evils as disease,
disability, personal injury, or death. It seems to me that a satisfactory
account should not be so limited. The ordinary concept of harm is
properly applied, for example, to the model who was prevented from
entering the Miss America pageant even though she was not subjected to
an evil of the kind just mentioned. There may well be a de minimis
constraint on the extent or seriousness of the setback to an interest that
must obtain before the setback will count as harm, but that is a different
matter. Even beyond that question, however, there remains more to be
said about which interferences with which interests should count as
harm, and it is to that general topic that I now turn.

34.

!d.
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IV. HARM, INTERESTS , AND

RIGHTS

While I have rejected Feinberg's counterfactual analysis of harm, I
have accepted his more fundamental point that a harm is a setback to an
interest. I have further argued for the thesis that such a setback should
be understood as an historical worsening. This invites the question:
Which are the interests that, when set back, give rise to harm? Is any
interference with any interest properly designated a harm?
Let me begin by considering a hypothetical discussed by Feinberg.
Suppose a rescuer rescues a seriously endangered person, but finds that
in order to effect the rescue and save the imperiled person' s life, he
necessarily has to break the other ' s arm in the process. One question
that arises is this: Is the rescuer liable for the broken arm if the rescuee
chooses to sue? But the piior, more fundamental question is the
following: Did the rescuer harm the rescuee? In answer, Feinberg offers
this argument:
[T]he broken-armed plaintiff su ffered a harmful condition with respect to his
arm, but the rescuer-defendant did not cause a condition that was harmful on
balance, offset as it was by the overriding benefit of rescue, and he cannot_be
said, therefore , to have ha rmed the plaintiff (in the relevant full sense) at a]l. 3:->

Shiffrin discusses this case and suggests, in light of her own affirmative
discussion of harm, that we should not deny that the necessarily broken
limb is a form of harm: "It imposes a condition of disability and inflicts
pain. It seems to meet the criteria of harm, then, and does so irrespective
of the concomitant benefits delivered alongside it; on these criteria, it
can be harm even if, in some overall sense, the event makes the person
better off. "36
Even if we do not accept Shiffrin's particular analysis of harm, she
nonetheless seems exactly right in her analysis of the limb-snapping
rescuer. Feinberg's claim to the contrary notwithstanding, there does not
seem to be some overall interest into which all harms and benefits can be
factored, making possible a net judgment about the harm (or benefit) that
any given person has recei ved overall.37 The general interests that might

35.

36.

FEINBERG, supra note 2 , a t 2 7 .
Shiffrin , supra note 3. at 1 2 5 .

In his contribution to this .�ymposium, Leo Katz offers a very interesting
37.
discussion of this kind of case. as well as of the general issue of netting out benefits
against harms. See Leo Katz, Wh at to Compi!IIS{it/! Some Swprising/y Unapprecia ted
Reasons Why the Problem Is So Hard. 40 S AN DIEGO L. REv. 1 345 (2003 ) . I cannot
discuss Katz's approach here, except to make the very general observation that I do not
think he distinguishes sufficiently clearly between the question of netting out, which
concerns the dual issues of the occuiTence of harm and the quantification of damages.
from the question of whether or not a harmful act was justified by the benefits it also
produced.
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plausibly be thought to be candidates for this role are, presumably,
welfare and autonomy. While autonomy strikes me as the more likely
possibility of the two, in the end I do not think our ordinary concept of
harm permits this kind of reductionism with respect to either of these
general interests. This is, in part, a point about the concepts of harm and
benefit themselves. While questions about the individuation of harms
can and do arise, I believe that our general tendency is to treat setbacks
to interests even in the same general category, for example, physical
injuries to different parts of the body, as distinct harms. This is true
even though personal injuries all tend to set back the same set of
interests, namely, autonomy and freedom of movement, health, life, the
physical integrity of the body, the interest in not experiencing pain, and
the interest in not experiencing mental or emotional distress. Obviously,
particular physical injuries set back various of these interests in different
degrees, and some injuries will leave some of these interests unaffected.
Perhaps that is part of the reason that we tend not to lump even
concurrent instances of physical injury, let alone setbacks to interests
that are less obviously systematically related, into a single aggregate
harm. A fortiori, we do not net out harms against benefits. The most
important reason not to lump or net out, however, is surely substantive
in character. We have no good reason to think that the myriad array of
interests that are subject to harm and benefit-those just mentioned in
connection with physical injury, for a start, and many others as well,
such as dignity, privacy, the interest that I have in living according to
proper values, and interests of various kinds that I have in tangible and
intangible property-can all be reduced to a single underlying interest of
any kind. (This is not to deny, of course, that there is much overlap
among the relevant interests.) As Shiffrin notes, the better way to view
the limb-snapping case is that in the particular circumstances, the
bestowal of the benefit (saving the rescuee's life) might justify the
breaking of his arm for purposes of criminal or civil liability. 38
I suggested in the preceding Patt that all harms are historical setbacks
to interests, but further noted that there was no reason to think that all
historical setbacks to interests are harms. I would like at this point to
3 8 . S h i ffi·in. supra note 3. at 1 26. Having d i scussed the netting-out i n terpretation
o f Feinberg ' s expl anat ion of the l i mb-sp l itti ng examp l e . S h i ffi ·i n goes on t o i nterpret
h i m, more charitably. as putting fo rward the i dea of j u sti fi cati o n of harm i nstead. Th i s is
a very p l ausible way to u n derstand the particu l ar examp l e , but it seems c lear that what
Feinberg himse l f had in m i nd was netti n g out n ot j u st i fication.
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engage in a speculative and somewhat tentative inquiry that takes this
thought as its starting point. It seems reasonable to think that there is
some set of core or primary interests, all of which are roughly concerned
with our well-being and how our lives go, that are, so to speak, the main
targets of harm. These core interests may overlap to some extent, and
some may be partially derivable from others. For present purposes,
there is no need to try to ascertain exactly what the core interests are, but
it seems plausible to think that many of the interests mentioned in the
preceding paragraph will figure on any acceptable list. Assuming there
is such a list of core interests, can we conclude that those are all the
interests that we have? I think the answer is clearly no. Consider, for
example, my interest in not being physically injured. As emerged in
earlier discussion, this interest probably represents an amalgam of
several different interests, but nothing will be lost for present purposes
by treating it as discrete and stand-alone in character. If I have an
interest in you not physically injuring me, surely I also have an interest
in you not trying to physically injure me, as well as an interest in you not
engaging in actions that would risk you physically injuring me. Does
this mean that if you try to injure me but fail, or if you subject me to a
risk of a physical injury that does not materialize, then I have been
harmed? It is of course possible that the trying or risking will interfere
with one or another of my core interests, say by causing me severe fright
or subjecting me to indignity. In order, therefore, to focus on the precise
question at issue, let me assume that no such core interest is set back by
the trying or risking. The question remains: Was I harmed simply
because you acted contrary to the interest that I have in you not
attempting to physically injure me (or the interest that I have in you not
subjecting me to certain kinds of risk)?
I have argued elsewhere 39 that because of the peculiar epistemic
character of risk, subjecting another person to risk cannot, in and of
itself, constitute a harm. I would now want to qualify that conclusion by
saying that risking cannot be regarded as adversely affecting any interest
that has a strong or plausible claim to be in the set of core or primary
interests. The further suggestion I am advancing is that the very existence
of a set of core interests will give rise to secondary interests which will
at least sometimes be second-order interests, meaning interests that are
defined recursively. The interest I have that you not subject me to
certain kinds of risk of physical injury is just such a second-order
interest. Do you harm me by acting contrary to that interest? My strong
intuition is that you do not. The idea of a core of protected interests is, I
39.

Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Hann, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
32 1 (David G. Owen ed., 1 995).
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believe, part of our concept of harm, although we may disagree about
which interests lie inside the core and which outside. (Consider moral or
aesthetic offence, for example.) Although I think Shiffrin was mistaken
to ignore the historical worsening aspect of harm and thereby to equate
harm with certain evil conditions alone, the fact that she focused on
certain evil conditions I take to be itself a recognition of this truth. Once
we have acknowledged, as I think the concept of harm itself forces us to
do, that some adverse effects on interests are harms and some are not,
the distinction between core interests on the one hand, and secondary
interests on the other, becomes a very natural way to further systematize
and make sense of this feature of the concept.
It is worth noting two further points about the suggested distinction
between first- and second-order interests. The first point is that,
theoretically, there could be higher -order interests still, and the more
rarefied these become, the less likely we are to say that interference with
them constitutes harm. This offers at least some support to the idea
that one cutoff between interests that can be harmed and those that
cannot-obviously, I do not need to claim that this is the only such
cutoff-should be drawn along the lines of core interests on the one
hand, and higher-order interests on the other. The second point is that,
even if it is true that interference with higher-order interests does not
generally constitute harm, it does not follow that higher-order interests
(or secondary interests generally) cannot be subject to a right. I assume,
for purposes of the present discussion, an interest theory of rights along
the lines proposed by Joseph Raz.40 There is nothing odd about the idea,
and indeed it seems intuitively correct, that I have a right that you not try
to physically injure me, even though a violation of that right which did
not cause me physical injury would not itself be harm. The right is
based on my interest that you not try to physically injure me, which is
itself a second-order interest recursively derived from my first-order,
core interest in not being physically injured. I can have a right that you
not behave in a certain way that is not, in and of itself, harmful to me,
because your behaving in that way might cause me to be harmed.
Obviously a great deal more remains to be said about the relationship
among harm, interests, and rights, and I cannot begin to do justice to the
topic here. But I would like to add a few remarks that at least suggest

40. RAZ, supra note 1 9 , at 1 65-92. I have benefited a great deal from Raz ' s
discussion o f the relationship between rights and interests.
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the direction that further discussion should take. 4 1 Why, it might be
asked, should a secondary interest ever be subject to a right, if interference
with that interest is not itself harm? The answer is that protecting
secondary interests often has instrumental importance. This is true, for
example, of the second-order interests that I have that others not try to
physically injure me or subject me to the risk of physical injury.
Protecting these interests will generally, although by no means invariably,
help to ensure that my core interest in not being physically injured does
not suffer a setback. On an interest theory of rights, A has a right against
B only if, inter alia, some interest of A's is a sufficient reason to hold B
to be under a duty.42 Clearly, the ultimate justification of a right that
others not try to injure me or subject me to a risk of injury is my core
interest in not being physically injured. But recognizing that the
justification of a right sometimes runs through a secondary, instrumental
interest shows that it is conceptually possible that a right can be violated,
and an interest set back, without any harm occurring. 43 Once this point
is recognized, it becomes clear that one cannot, for example, simply help
oneself to the conclusion that risk is harm by mere virtue of the fact that
risking sets back an interest. All too often, I believe, the justification for
this conclusion takes essentially this form, 44 when what is required is a
substantive moral argument to the effect that a secondary, instrumental
interest is, for some purposes at least, morally on a par with a
fundamental interest. In the absence of such an argument, there is simply
no reason to think that risking is harming.
Something similar holds for affirmative rights. Consider the important
4 1 . These remarks were prompted by the comments of John Goldberg and others
on the version of this Article that I presented at the symposium on compensation and the
Oxford Jurisprudence Colloquium.
42. RAZ, supra note 1 9, at 1 66. I should note that the distinction between core and
secondary interests is related to, but not the same as, the distinction that Raz draws
between core and derivative rights. See id. at 168-70.
43. Often, of course, and perhaps usually, a right is justified directly b y the core
interest. When this is the case, a violation of the right is itself h arm. If A violates a right
that B has not to be i njured, then A has harmed B. B ut there are important examples, in
addition to trying and risking, when thi s is not the case. Consider, for example, the
interesting case of trespass, which is raised by John Goldberg in his comment. See
Goldberg, supra note 1 9, at 1 32 1 -22. The right that oth ers not trespass on one ' s land
protects an interest in the exclusive possession of the land. It seems to me that this
interest is secondary and instrumental ; we only protect it in order to protect other
interests, such as autonomy and privacy interests. Goldberg is thus correct to conclude
that there can be harmless trespasses. On the general issue of harmless wrongs, see also
Heidi M. Hurd, What in the Wo rld Is Wrong ?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 57 , 2 1 2- 1 5
( 1 994).
44.

See, e.g. , Wright, supra note 24, at 1 8 1 4- 1 6 .
An exception to this
generalization is Matthew Adler' s very interesting argument in Matthew D. Adler, Risk,
Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1 293 (2003). Unfortunately, I cannot discuss Adler' s approach to these issues here.
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cases of promising and contracting. Suppose that A promises B that, on
a certain date and at a certain time, A will turn a pirouette. So far as the
content of the promise is concerned, we can assume that nothing turns
on whether or not B knows that A has turned the pirouette. But even if B
never finds out whether or not A has done the promised act, A nonetheless
has an obligation to turn a pirouette, and B has a corresponding right that
A perform this action. It is possible, of course, that A's failure to turn a
pirouette will harm B. B might rely in some way on A's turning the
pirouette, or B might suffer disappointment when he discovers that A did
not do as she promised. But let us assume that B did not so rely, and he
never finds out whether or not A performed as promised. B nonetheless
has an interest that A perform a pirouette at the specified time and place.
As Raz has argued, every person has an interest that promises made to
him will be kept, and B's interest in A's performing a pirouette is just a
special instance of this more general interest.45 In contract law, both the
general and the special interest are known, in a harmless ambiguity, as
the expectation interest. This is the interest that is protected by B's right
to performance.46 For obvious practical reasons, promises do not usually
get made unless performance of the promise is likely to benefit the
promisee.47 By "benefit," I mean the advancement of one or more of the
promisee' s core interests. But the expectation interest itself is best
viewed as a secondary, instrumental interest. Thus, advancement of the
expectation interest does not necessarily confer a benefit in the sense of
advancing a core interest, and it is plausible to think that this is true in
the pirouette case. Still less does a setback to the expectation interest,
through a failure to fulfill one ' s duty to perform as promised, in itself
constitute harm. Thus, it would be very implausible to think that if A
violates B's right that A tum a pirouette, A has ipso facto harmed B.
V. HARM AND COMPENSATION

I come, finally, to the relationship between harm and compensation,
particularly in the context of the law of torts. I have argued in preceding
Parts that a necessary condition of harm, and indeed one of its principal
features, is that there must have been an historical setback to one of the
45. Cf RAZ, supra note 1 9, at 1 75. The alternative view, which Raz rejects (I
believe correctly), is that the right is based on the promisee ' s interest in the promised act.
46. See generally Peter B enson, Con tract, in A COMPAN I ON TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24 (Dennis Patterson ed. , 1 996 ).
47. Cf RAZ, supra note 1 9, at 1 75.
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relevant interests of the person who allegedly suffered harm. Assume
for the present that this understanding of harm is correct. If A
wrongfully harms B, and if harm is properly understood as an historical
worsening, why should corrective justice not require full compensation
for that very harm? Consider a variation on the Kingston case that
involves preemptive causation. A wrongfully sets a fire which burns
down B's house. If A ' s fire had not had this effect, then a naturally
caused fire (say, one set by lightning) would have burned the house down
a few moments later. The courts have generally said in this situation that
B is not entitled to compensation, or if she is, it is only for the few
moments of house-possession of which A deprived her.48 The general
position was set down in 1 88 0 by Lord Blackburn in the Rawyards case:
I do not think there is any difference of opinion as to its being a general rule
that, where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of
money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible
get at that sum of money which wil l put the party who has been injured, or who
has suffered, in the same position as he would h ave been in if he h ad not
sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or
reparation.49

Determining compensation, in other words, requires a counterfactual
inquiry. The idea is to put the plaintiff in the position that he or she
would have been in had the tort not occurred, to the extent that this can
be done with money.
Let me return to my question about the variant on Kingston just
described. If A burned down B' s house, why should he not pay for it,
even though it would have burned down anyway? Shouldn' t corrective
justice require him to correct the harm he caused, regardless of what else
might have happened if he had not committed his wrong? The answer
cannot be that the Rawyards principle is a conceptual implication of the
concept of compensation, because that is clearly not true. A principle
that looked to the status quo ante as a baseline of compensation rather
Cf Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 1 63 A . I l l, 1 1 4- 1 5 (N.H. 1 932).
Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., [ 1 8 80] 5 A.C. 25, 39 (H.L.). John
Goldberg has suggested that the language in Rawyards might be understood as indirectly
invoking an historical worsening approach to quantifyi ng damages and notes further that
many jury instructions refer explicitly to the idea of restoring the plaintiff to the status
quo ante. See Goldberg, supra note 1 9, at 1 32 1 & n . l 9 . I believe that a detailed
exawJnation of subsequent English cases would bear out the claim that English law is to
be understood as requiring damages to be assessed counterfactually rather than
h istorically, but I acknowledge that in American law there is some disagreement, and
perhaps equivocation, about this issue. For a statement of an American equivalent of the
Rawyards principle, see McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. 1 989) ("The
goal [of an award of compensatory damages] is to restore the injured party, to the extent
possible, to the position that would have been occupied had the wrong not occurred.")
(citation omitted).
48.
49.
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than to what would have happened had the wrong not occurred is
perfectly coherent and, indeed, has much to be said for it in a substantive
sense. The answer also cannot be that to give B compensation for her
house would be to give her a windfall, because in the absence of a
justificatory argument for one result or the other, it is just as much a
windfall for A not to have to pay compensation.
The Rawyards principle does seem to me to state a generally correct
understanding of how damages should be awarded in torts, or rather it
states a first approximation of such an understanding, for there are
exceptions. What is the basis for saying this? I am by no means
satisfied with my answer, and I wish I had a better one. The only
justification that I can offer takes roughly the following form. An award
of compensatory damages is, in the first instance, supposed to make
good the historical harm that one party has caused another. But such an
award is obviously not intended literally to roll back the past. Given that
impossibility, there are a number of factors that are appropriately taken
into account in quantifying damages in monetary terms. One of these is
what we might call "net-worseoffness," which is the difference, as
ascertained by a counterfactual inquiry, between the plaintiff's current
circumstances and the circumstances he or she would have been in had
the wrong not occurred. Given that B' s house would have burned down
anyway, so that even though A has caused B harm he has not actually
left her worse off, it is a reasonable view of what justice requires
between the parties to say that A does not have to pay for the house.
Discounting for contingencies would be justified along similar lines. I
emphasize that this is a substantive and contestable moral judgment, not
a conceptual truth of any kind. It is also important to see that while net
worseoffness is a morally relevant factor in the quantification of
damages, it is only one among others. Thus the Rawyards principle does
not state a hard and fast rule. Out of an abundance of caution I should
also emphasize that net-worseoffness is not, for the reasons that were
given in Parts II and IV, an issue that arises in the determination of
whether or not there has been harm. It is, rather, a factor to be taken into
account in the assessment of damages.
To see why net-worseoffness is only one factor among others in the
quantification of damages, consider the basic fact situation of Kingston
again. Two fires joined and burned down the plaintiff's house, where
either fire alone would have been sufficient to cause that outcome. The
defendant set one of the fires, whereas the other was of unknown origin.

131 1

The court said that if the other fire could be shown to be of natural

origin,

A

would not have to pay

application of the

B compensation . This i s a clear
Rawyards principle. But the court then went on to say

that if, as it assumed was in fact the case,

50

the second fire had been

tortiously set, then both tortfeasors could be held j ointly and severally
liable for the harm.

Given that only the one tortfeasor was before the

court, that person could be held fully liable. The court refused, in other
words, to apply the

Rawyards principle to this set of facts. The inj ustice

of allowing a tortfeasor to escape liability by pointing to what another
tortfeasor had done was held to be of sufficient moral weight to
overcome the prima facie assumption that

A

does not have to pay

compens ation for a kind of harm that would have occurred anyway. It is

very arguable that the same result should be reached when the second
tortfeasor did not causally contribute to the actual harm, but would have
caused similar harm had the first tortfeasor not already done

so.

Because the second tortfeasor did not actually cause any harm, he cannot

be held liable.

But it can nonetheless be argued that the first tortfeasor

should have to pay full compensation because, one way or another, the

harm the plaintiff was bound to suffer would have been tortiously
caused, and it would be unjust to let her go uncompensated. And this is
5
the result that at least some courts have seen fit to reach. 1
What, then, are we to say of the venerable doomed airplane?

Most

commentators assume that the taxi driver does h ave to pay compensation,
and my intuitions run in the same direction.

that the case does not raise the

It should be emphasized

Rawyards principle at all; there is no

question of even trying to put the plaintiff in the position he would have

been in had the tort not occurred (namely dead).

Rather the case raises

the problem of offset: When, and under what circumstances, should the
benefits that flow from the defendant' s tortious actions serve to mitigate
damages?

It should also be emphasized that offset, being a question of

damages, is different from the question of whether the occurrence of

harm depends on a netting -out effect, and different again from the
question of whether or not an accompanying benefit justifies a harmful

action, that is, renders it nonwrongfuP2 The most plausible understanding
of the limb-splitting rescuer, for example, is that his action was justified

by the fact that causing the harm avoided an even greater harm, namely

50. The court reversed the burden of proof on this issue. lt is not obvious that it
was correct to do so, but that point is not directly relevant to the question currently under
consideration.
5 1 . See, e.g. , B aker v. Willoughby [ 1 970] A.C . 467, 494 (H.L. 1 969).
52. Shiffiin offers a very interesting discussion of the j ustification question. See
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1 25-3 1 .
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53
death. The question of damages would thus not even arise. If, in the
doomed airplane hypothetical, the taxi driver had intentionally injured
the would-be passenger as the only available means of preventing him
from getting on the airplane, the issue of justification would have to be
addressed. 54 But that issue clearly does not arise when the driver
negligently injures the would-be passenger with no inkling that the plane
is doomed to crash.
The benefit in the doomed airplane hypothetical is, of course, the
avoidance of the harm of death. The Restatement says there should be
offset "to the extent that this is equitable."55 Although not very helpful
in concrete terms, this nonetheless strikes me as an appropriate way to
put the point: Offset is another factor that is morally relevant to the
quantification of damages, but it is one that requires substantive moral
judgments that may be quite controversial and that may shift from case
to case. I do not have a knockdown argument one way or another in the
case of the doomed airplane, but I believe the equities run against
mitigation because the benefit is too much of a coincidence, and too
little connected to the defendant's actual actions, to be appropriately
treated as an offset. The case is reminiscent in this respect of the
coincidence cases that arise under the rubric of proximate cause. 56 As a
result of the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff is, say, placed under a
tree that just happens to fall at the precise moment that he or she is there.
The coincidence rules out liability in such a case, and my sense is that it
should similarly rule out offset in the case of the doomed airplane. 57 But
I concede that one could probably make a respectable argument that
would come out the other way.

5 3 . This i s not to say that there can never b e liability for a justified act. See
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 1 24 N.W. 22 1 , 222 (Minn . 1 9 1 0).
54. Leo Katz discusses this variation of the doomed airplane hypothetical. See
Katz, supra note 37, at 1 348.
5 5 . RESTATEMENT (SEC OND) OF TORTS § 920 ( 1 979).
56. See, e.g., Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 43 A 240 (Pa. 1 899).
57. At the conference on compensation, some participants dubbed this the "symmetry"
principle.
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